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Abstract 
This paper is the first of a series that attempts to assess the possible health and safety risks associated with large scale CO2 sequestration in deep 
brine reservoirs. The approach is based on analysis of available data on the operational track record from CO2 transportation and injection 
associated with enhanced oil recovery (CO2-EOR) in the US. This paper is particularly concerned with identification of the main business risks 
facing a company engaged in geological sequestration. Such risks include both the operational risks of capturing, compressing, transporting and 
injecting CO2, as well as the risk of accidental, rapid CO2 release from wells (including an analysis of blow out data from CO2 injection wells, 
worked over wells as well as abandoned wells). Observations of the outcomes from accidents in real pipelines and CO2 injection wells in 
CO2-EOR projects provide the most concrete basis to predict the future safety of the above ground operations of CO2 sequestration in deep 
brine reservoirs. 
© 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved 
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1. Introduction 
Climate change concerns are driving attempts to lower the carbon intensity of global energy production. The US has more 
energy resources in coal deposits than the Middle East has in oil. Coal can be extracted at low costs, and can play a major role in 
the future energy portfolio if cost effective separation and sequestration of CO2 emissions can be developed. The aim of 
geological CO2 sequestration is to attempt to moderate climate change by effecting long-term subsurface CO2 storage to decrease 
the rate of CO2 growth in the atmosphere. To capture and put CO2 into long term storage in deep-brine reservoirs, oil reservoirs, 
and/or depleted gas fields. Most risk studies of geologic carbon sequestration have either focused on the probability that leakage 
could result in safety or health issues or have attempted calculate general leakage probabilities.  Although safety and health 
issues are always of paramount concern, the excellent safety and health record of the CO2 industry in the Permian Basin of West 
Texas may suggest that these issues are not a major component of the business risk faced by a putative carbon sequestration 
industry.  
 
This paper is particularly concerned with identification of the main business risks facing a company engaged in geological 
sequestration. Such risks include: (1) the operational risks of capturing, compressing, transporting and injecting CO2; (2) the risk 
of blowouts or very rapid CO2 release from wells; (3) the risk that CO2 put into long term geologic storage will leak into shallow 
aquifers and contaminate potable water by lowering pH and increasing dissolved metals and other components; and (4) the risk 
that sequestered CO2 (and possibly associated methane gas) will leak into the atmosphere reversing the climate change benefits 
of sequestration and perhaps requiring repayment of CO2 sequestration credits. Of these risks the first two can be directly 
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addressed by looking at the track record of the CO2-EOR industry. The technology and practices used by the CO2-EOR industry 
in handling and injecting CO2 is a valuable resource for future CO2 sequestration projects.  
 
The CO2-EOR industry has more than 35 years of experience in successfully transporting and injecting CO2. In the US alone 
the industry operates thousands of CO2 EOR wells, over 3,500 miles of high pressure CO2 pipelines, has injected over 600 
million tons of CO2 (11 trillion standard cubic feet) and produces about 245,000 barrels of oil a day from CO2 EOR projects. Few 
risk studies have looked at the pragmatic problem of how to evaluate the absolute (or relative) risk of sequestration projects in 
specific sites. The initial stage of planning a large-scale carbon storage project requires evaluation of the relative risks associated 
with specific alternative sequestration sites. A risk assessment will likely be required before corporations can finance such 
projects and such a study is also the first step in setting up risk management strategies.  
 
The risks associated with CO2 sequestration in brine reservoirs have been addressed in an EU funded study of geological CO2 
sequestration (Holloway [1]). It has also been analyzed in some detail in the environmental impact assessments completed for the 
four competing sites for the ill-fated FutureGen project. An important aim of designing large scale pilot injection programs such 
as Phase III of the Carbon Sequestration Partnership should be to gather information that will help companies to better evaluate 
the business risks associated with geologic CO2 sequestration. The identification of optimal sites for large-scale demonstration 
projects provides a challenging test for the utility of available risk models and approaches.  
 
This paper assesses the possible health and safety risks associated with large scale CO2 sequestration in deep brine reservoirs 
based on analysis of available data from CO2 injection for enhanced oil recovery (CO2 EOR) in the US. This paper is the first of 
a series that will make a systematic review of all accident and blowout data associated with CO2 pipeline transport and injection 
available in the US. These papers will then use this data to examine the pragmatic problem of how to evaluate the absolute (or 
relative) risk of sequestration projects in specific sites. The initial stage of planning a large-scale carbon storage project requires 
evaluation of the relative risks associated with specific alternative sequestration sites. A risk assessment will be required before 
corporations can finance such projects and such a study is also the first step in setting up risk management strategies.  
2. Operational Risks in CO2-EOR 
Holloway [2] suggested that risks related to the “transport and injection of carbon dioxide” are “reasonably well understood 
and already borne by the enhanced oil recovery industry in the USA”. This conclusion was supported by Heinrich et al. [3] who 
noted that such risks have been “successfully managed” for decades in the context of commercial EOR operations. Similarly de 
Figueiredo [4] has asserted that the risks associated with CO2 injection into a brine reservoir has been “successfully managed” for 
decades in EOR operations. Recently this conclusion has been echoed by Robertson et al. [5] who asserted “Operational liability 
[for CO2 sequestration in brine reservoirs] is similar to that already dealt with in the oil and gas industry and therefore few new 
issues should arise when applied to CCS”. Although the assertions of these authors may well be correct there are little published 
data or analysis to support them. In fact Connolly [6] has declared that “There is relatively little experience worldwide in 
managing the risks associated with CO2, compared with oil and gas”.  
 
Gale and Davidson [7] have suggested that the transportation of CO2 pipeline is analogous to that of natural gas transport. 
They also suggest that although accident rate for CO2 pipelines is similar to that for natural gas pipelines, the amount of damages 
associated with incidents for natural gas pipelines is much higher than for CO2 pipelines. Significantly no serious injuries or 
deaths have been caused by accidents associated with CO2 pipelines. In the Permian Basin pipeline complex the accident records 
started in the mid-1970s. Svensson et al. [8] have suggested that statistical data on pipeline safety for CO2 pipelines used by the 
CO2-EOR industry demonstrate that the risks for pipeline leakage “are lower than for natural gas or hazardous pipelines”. Barrie 
et al. [9] noted that the CO2 pipelines constitute a smaller statistical sample compared to natural gas pipelines. They further 
suggest that it is “reasonable to suggest” that statistically of the projected number of CO2 pipeline incidents “should be similar to 
those for natural gas transmission”. The risk associated with natural gas production and transportation is well known. Before a 
quantitative analysis can be made comparing the risks associated with CO2 injection and transportation with natural gas it is 
desirable to get an improved understanding of CO2-EOR industries safety record.  
3. Risk associated with transport of CO2 by pipelines 
Case Study One: The Dakota Gasification Company Pipeline 
 
This pipeline, operated by the Dakota Gasification Company, is 328 kilometers long and has a capacity of 5 million tons a 
year. The gas stream averages 95.95% CO2 with an average 0.80% H2S (occasionally as high as 2% H2S). The pipeline system 
has a number of safety systems including leak/rupture detection and automatic block valve closure along the pipeline route. The 
entire pipeline and compression operations are monitored by telemetry giving 24-hour real-time measurements of pressures, 
temperatures and flow rates. This telemetry system provides the capability for early detection of potential problems. 
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In the event of a pipeline leak, block valves are used to isolate the affected section and limit the volume of CO2 released. Any 
significant leak results in a pressure drop of a large leak that activates the shut-off valves. The spacing of such control valves is 
set by U.S. Department of Transportation (USDOT) safety regulations and safety considerations. The pipeline has been designed 
to be inspected by instrumented internal inspection devices designed to detect corrosion or other defects that may impact pipeline 
integrity. Since it started operating in 2000 the system has had only one very minor leakage incident caused by a component 
failure. 
 
Case Study Two: Denbury Pipeline Complex 
 
Denbury Resources, based in Plano, Texas, owns and operates 562 kilometers of CO2 pipelines (Table 1) radiating from the 
Jackson Dome, a large source of natural CO2 in Central Mississippi. The longest segment (the NEJD pipeline) built by Shell in 
the mid 1980’s extends from the Jackson Dome to east central Louisiana. Safety monitoring of Denbury’s pipelines is based on 
24/7 real-time data transmission by satellite, monitoring of critical flow parameters including moisture level, flow rate, pressure, 
and temperature at strategic locations. These systems enable operators to balance the flow of CO2 in and out of the pipeline, thus 
ensuring the integrity of the pipelines and reducing the response time for field personnel to respond on those rare occasions when 
a problem is detected.  
 
Table 1. Some characteristics of selected CO2 pipelines 
Pipeline Location Operator 
CO2 
Capacity 
[Mt/year] 
Length 
[km] 
Construction 
Year Origin of CO2 
Cortez USA Kinder Morgan 19.3 808 1984 McElmo Dome 
Sheep 
Mountain USA BP 9.5 660 - 
Sheep 
Mountain 
Bravo USA BP 7.3 350 1984 Bravo Dome 
Val Verde USA Petrosource 2.5 130 1998 Val Verde Gas Plants 
Bati 
Raman Turkey 
Turkish 
Petroleum 1.1 90 1983 Dodan Field 
Weyburn USA & Canada 
North Dakota 
Gasification Co. 5 328 2000 
Gasification 
Plant 
NEJD USA Denbury 11.5 293 1986 Jackson Dome 
Free State USA Denbury 6.7 138 2005 Jackson Dome 
Delta USA Denbury 7.7 49 2008 Jackson Dome 
Cranfield USA Denbury 2.88 82 1963 Jackson Dome 
 
Total 
 
   
73.48 
 
 
2,928 
 
  
 
Denbury has had very few safety issues related to unintentional releases on its major cross-country CO2 pipelines. Through a 
combination of good mechanical and cathodic protection design, sound construction practices, diligent surveillance, regular 
maintenance, and continuous monitoring of critical parameters (moisture, pressure, temperature, flow rate), Denbury’s pipeline 
systems have been relatively trouble-free. The single biggest threat to the integrity remains to be involuntary shut downs due to 
third-parties damaging the pipeline (during activities such as trenching), loss of power and communications caused by weather 
events, for which precautionary measures are taken to minimize the impact. Five accidental releases of CO2 have occurred since 
the pipeline operations resumed. The volumes of CO2 released are difficult to measure during these events, but the leaks were 
fairly short in duration due to closing block valves and/or safety shut down systems.  
 
On the Free State pipeline, two leak incidents occurred soon after pressurizing the line and were caused by manufacturing 
imperfections in welds. Both these leaks were too small to be detected by the flow measurement imbalance.  A landowner called 
the toll-free number on the pipeline signage to alert the control room of unusual white smog emerging from the ground where the 
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pipeline was located on his property, triggering a response from Denbury’s Operations group.  The third incident on the Tinsley 
8” line, occurred when an excavator accidentally cut the line. Company personnel were onsite for immediate dispatch to isolate 
the system.  On the Barksdale 6-3 #1 flowline incident (cement lined pipe rupture due to inadequate weld pre-heating), automatic 
shut-downs and alarms worked as designed.  In the fifth incident at a pump station was minimal and observed by on-scene 
personnel. On the Free State pipeline, each leak caused minimal release but a controlled release of ~75 MMCF (each) was 
required to depressurize the pipeline segment for repair.  
4. CO2 well blowouts 
The blowout of a well occurs when the operator of the well loses control of the pressure in the well resulting in fluid flow out 
of the well. Damen et al. [10] have suggested that the largest risk associated with CO2 injection for sequestration in deep brine 
reservoirs is well failure. Such failures result from a failure to adequately control pressures in the injection system. This is 
typically due to mechanical failure of a component or an external event directly affecting the well. This results in temporary loss 
of control of the process and the pressure of the reservoir drives CO2 and other entrained fluids upwards out of the well. Four 
types of blowouts have occurred associated with CO2-EOR activities: 
 
1. Blowouts of production wells drilled into natural CO2 reservoirs 
 
2. Blowouts of  CO2 injection wells 
 
3. Blowouts of active oil production wells that are an integral part of the CO2-EOR project 
 
4. Blowouts of inactive or plugged and abandoned wells within the area of increased pressure associated with CO2 
injection wells 
 
In the US experience with CO2 well blowouts can be traced back to March, 1982, when a blowout occurred in the Sheep 
Mountain CO2 field (one of three large natural reservoirs of CO2 serving the Permian Basin’s EOR activities), located in the 
Colorado Plateau area of southern Colorado. In this context, a well blowout occurs when the drilling crew fails to contain the 
subsurface pressure. In most cases blowouts are caused by mechanical failures beyond human control, for example the failure of 
a back-flow preventer. This loss of containment immediately results in the pressure release vaporizing the supercritical CO2.  
 
In this context a blowout is driven by the high expansibility of the released gas resulting in a vigorous eruption of the vapor up 
the well bore (with the likely entrainment of particles of solid debris). If this occurs during drilling into a CO2 reservoir the 
rapidity of this phenomenon may make it a challenge to activate manual Blowout Prevention devices (BOPs) in time to prevent a 
blowout. Adiabatic cooling of CO2 during this rapid expansion leads to the gas being cooled below the freezing point (the triple 
point for CO2 being at -63°F and 76 psi). This results in the nucleation of dry ice and/or solid ice-like CO2-hydrates. These solids 
can result in a blowout becoming a spray of solid particles. Such icy particles could damage pipes and other infrastructure in the 
path of the spraying particles. Whether this phenomenon is less risky than the CO2 irrupting as a fountain of dense CO2 remains 
to be determined. If much of the CO2 in a large blowout is in a frozen form then the risks posed by the initial blowout to the local 
are probably lowered.  
 
The blowout at the Sheep Mountain Field occurred March 17-April 3, 1982, during the drilling of a CO2 production well on 
the west slope of Little Sheep Mountain (Lynch, et al. [11]). The reservoir containing the CO2 is at depths of 1000 to 1800 m 
depth in sandstones of Cretaceous and Jurassic age, sealed by fine grained marine sediments of Cretaceous age (Allis et al.[12]). 
A contractor called in to “kill” the blowout initially had problems related to the high flow rate of CO2 (estimated at 200 million 
standard cubic feet/day) out of the well. The CO2 was blowing out the brine-based “kill fluid” (and entrained drilling mud and 
debris). The well came under control the next month through the injection of drag-reduced brine followed by mud (Lynch, et al. 
[11]). The industry now has an increased understanding of handling CO2 wells.  
 
Blowouts of oil production wells within CO2-EOR reservoirs are a known hazard (Lynch et al. [11]; Skinner [13]). In 2003, 
Skinner in a paper in “World Oil” focusing on blowouts in the CO2-EOR industry in the US suggested that there had been an 
“increased frequency of CO2 blowouts in injection projects”. Four of the five blowouts presented in the case studies of Skinner 
[13] occurred during remediation (or work-overs) of wells. Well work-overs are commonly done to reuse pre-existing wells for 
use in CO2 EOR projects. For commercial CO2 sequestration projects it is highly unlikely that old wells would ever be reused as 
injection wells. 
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Case Study One: Blowouts CO2-EOR Operations of Company A  
 
Company A utilizes several safety and preventive measures monitor and mitigate potential blowouts. Company A uses alarms, 
automatic shutdowns, and human monitoring. Recently Company A has been converting sites to 24 hour manned operations in 
order to detect and respond to any abnormal conditions and to promote more effective mitigation. 
 
As noted by Skinner [13] the greatest danger for loss of well control is during work over operations. During such operations, 
Company A uses standard industry safeguards on the rigs. As part of their blowout prevention strategies Company A does daily 
monitoring of tubing, production casing and surface casing. Automatic reports are sent out if the pressure measured for 
production casing or surface casing is greater than zero.  
 
Over the last five years of operation Company A has experienced 7 blowouts, incidents where they have temporarily lost 
control of wells. One of these incidents was associated with a CO2 production well at when coiled tubing packing failed during 
well work. Two other incidents where associated with CO2 injection wells. One was caused by leaking gasket at a well head. The 
other was not a problem with well itself but rather occurred when a mechanical seal was blown on HP booster pump. The other 
three incidents were associated with production wells. One incident occurred when a casing valve was accidentally left open 
during work-over operations. Another production well unexpectedly started to flow CO2 before it was converted to and EOR 
producer. In the third incident, a problem occurred during the installation of a Blow-Out-Preventer stack during workover 
operations. There were no deaths or injuries associated with any of these event. 
 
It is very difficult to determine with precision the amount of CO2 that was released in each of these incidents due to the nature 
of the events. Company A engineers have estimated that the release rates ranged from <1 mmcf per day to 10 mmcf per day.  The 
largest event in one of the production wells, occurred over 4 days and Company A engineers have estimated that approximately 
40 MMcf of CO2 (an average of 10 MMcf per day was vented over four days).  
 
Company A has begun to deploy fixed monitors strategically placed throughout their CO2-EOR facilities. These monitors 
measure CO2, O2, LEL, and H2S. The accuracy of the new monitors described is +/- 1000 ppm (0.1%). The blowout events 
discussed above were at wells not at the time equipped with fixed CO2 monitors.  CO2 measurements were conducted during the 
accidental release at one of the producers was monitored by portable sensors. Two hundred feet from the release maximum 
concentrations recorded were approximately 4750 ppm (0.475%). The elevated concentrations dissipated quickly (within 30 
minutes). This type of data will be extremely valuable in validating modelling of risks associated with accidental CO2 releases.  
 
Case Study Two: Blowouts CO2-EOR Operations of Company B and Company C 
 
Over the last five years of operation Company B has experienced five blowouts, incidents in which they have temporarily lost 
control of wells. No injuries or deaths have resulted from any of these accidents. Four of these incidents were apparently caused 
by the failure of mechanical components (two due to valve failures, two due to failure of nipples). The fifth failure was not 
related to the well itself but rather was caused by failure of a pump component related to corrosion. None of the five incidents 
appear to have been caused by human error.  
 
Over the past ten years Company C has experienced twelve well blowouts involving temporary loss of control of CO2 wells. 
Six of these incidents were associated with failure of physical components such as valves. One blowout occurred during the 
installation of a blowout preventer. One incident that was clearly related to human error was caused by a truck backing over an 
injection well. Another blowout occurred when CO2 reached a planned production well before a well work over could be 
completed. Again one of the “blowout” incidents was caused by the failure of a pump component.  
5. Conclusions 
The  thirty seven plus years of history of  CO2 injection involved in CO2 based Enhanced Oil Recovery in the US  represent 
the most tangible evidence available for understanding the risks of CO2 sequestration in deep brine reservoirs. In the case of both 
pipeline incidents and blowouts; component failure rather than corrosion or human errors have resulted in the leakage of CO2. 
The rarity of corrosion related incidents reflects the industries success in implementing anti-corrosion measures. In the case of 
blowouts, incidents related to CO2 production wells from natural reservoirs and those that occurred during work over of 
production wells, resulting from unexpectedly early CO2 breakthroughs are not directly relevant to understanding the risk of CO2 
sequestration in deep brine reservoirs. The CO2-EOR industry has an excellent safety record. 
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